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Article 2

By Colin Wakefield*

Trial and Pretrial Publicity
In English Criminal Justice
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article aims to provide a statement of the law relating to
trial and pretrial publicity in England. The discussion is limited
to criminal cases, because it is in this area that there has been the
greatest controversy in the United States-and Nebraska in particular. English courts are not bound by entrenched constitutional
principles, and it may appear to the American reader that when the
English courts balance conflicting interests of a free press and a
fair trial, they are rather arbitrary in their preference for the latter.
The rights of the individual defendant are afforded the greatest
protection-a premise more often tacitly accepted than explicitly
justified. Yet the law is not all one-sided. The following account
is designed to show where the line is drawn.
There are few statutory provisions governing the issue of trial
and pretrial publicity. These mainly relate to restrictions on the
reporting of proceedings in court, are encroachments upon the
common law freedom to report everything, and are justified by the
need for protection of the individual or by interest in public
decency. The law relating to pretrial and posttrial publicity, largely still governed by the common law, is discussed in the latter part
of the article, along with a discussion of when information relating
to a trial becomes sub judice. First, an examination of what may
be published during a trial will be helpful.
II. REPORTING COURT PROCEEDINGS
In 1924, Lord Hewart, C.J., stated that it "is of fundamental
importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."' His statement illustrates the guiding principle that in England both criminal and civil
proceedings should be in open court.
* Lecturer in Law, University of Reading, England.

B.A. 1971, M.A.

1975, University of Cambridge; LL.B. 1976, University of London.
The author thanks Professor Graham Zellick of the University of
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1. The King v. Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1923).

228

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 2 (1977)

The basis of this principal is historical. In early days, the jury
were neighbours, and were supposed to know the facts even before
the case came to court. As the system developed, and juries were
expected to decide on the evidence presented to them in court, the
open nature of the proceedings was not diminished, for the result
of a case was still taken to represent a public decision.
The history of matrimonial proceedings is different. These
cases came before the ecclesiastical courts and the facts were
ascertained in private, although judgment would be given in open
court. When jurisdiction passed to the Court for Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes in the nineteenth century, 2 the evidence still
sometimes was taken in camera. The legality of such a procedure
was examined by the House of Lords in 1913 in Scott v. Scott,3
where it was decided that no court had power to hear any matrimonial cause'in camera merely in the interests of public decency.
Viscount Haldane, L.C., held that the effect of the Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 was to provide that the new
Divorce Court should conduct its business according to the general
principles regarding publicity which regulated the other courts in
the country. The most important of these was that all cases must
be conducted in open court. Any limitation on this principle did
not depend on the exercise of judicial discretion, but had to be
based on the application of some other overriding principle. Any
exception was supposed to be "the outcome of a yet more fundamental principle that the chief object of Courts of justice must be
to secure that justice is done. ' '4 When the subject matter of the
action would be destroyed by a hearing in open court, as in the
case of some secret process of manufacture, the hearing might be in
camera.5 The same result would follow when tumult or disorder
would make a public hearing impracticable, or when it was impossible to force an unwilling witness to give evidence in public. 6 But
the interests of public decency alone would not merit such exclusion at common law, and the House of Lords stressed that the
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85.
[1913] A.C. 417.
Id. at 437.
Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Levinstein, [1883] 24 Ch. D. 156
(secret process); Andrew v. Raeburn, [1874] L.R. 9 Ch. 522 (publication of certain letters in open court would entirely destroy the matter
in dispute).
6. See, e.g., Moosrugger v. Moosrugger, 29 T.L.R. 658 (1913) (decided
four months after Scott v. Scott). In Moosrugger, a divorce case, the
wife's evidence was "so horrible" that her voice was scarcely audible.
Because of her unwillingness to testify, Evans, P., decided that notwithstanding Scott v. Scott he had power to hear the witness in camera, and the court and gallery were cleared.

2.
3.
4.
5.
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proceedings should be in private only if essential in the interests of
justice. The examples given are not exclusive. 7 When necessary
for public safety or the defence of the realm, neither press nor
public may be admitted to trial proceedings. 8
Any hearing in camera must be justified either at common law
according to the principles in Scott or by statute. The general rule
is that there should be an open hearing in all cases. Coupled with
this is the principle that, generally, court proceedings to which the
public are admitted can be publicised, because an accurate report
of the proceedings really only serves to enlarge the courtroom and
admit more spectators.
The common law thus recognised free reporting as the natural
extension of open hearings. The most striking statements have
been taken from civil cases, but the principle in English law is
pervasive. Reporting restrictions however, have been imposed by
Parliament in certain areas. Reporters may be present as members
of the public in the cases covered, but they may not report any
matter outside the limits determined by the legislature.
A.

Statutory Restrictions
1. Committal Proceedings

The most important and most recent restriction on the reporting
of court proceedings is contained in section 3 of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1967, and limits the reporting of committal proceedings. A committal hearing before magistrates determines whether
there is a prima facie case against an accused charged with an
indictable offence and whether he should be sent for trial by jury in
the Crown Court. The prosecution evidence therefore must be
presented to establish whether there is a sufficiently strong case to
answer; but in practice the accused normally reserves his defence,
and usually even consents to the committal on the basis of written
depositions alone. Unrestricted reporting of these proceedings
clearly can be prejudicial to the accused, for potential jurors will be
presented with only one side of the case in the press. Yet such
7. In Scott v. Scott, Earl Loreburn stated:
It would be impossible to enumerate or anticipate all possible
contingencies, but in all cases where the public has been excluded with admitted propriety, the underlying principle...
is that the administration of justice would be rendered impractical by their presence, whether because the case could
not be effectively tried, or the parties entitled to justice would
be reasonably deterred from seeking it at the hands of the
Court.
[1913] A.C. at 446.
8. The King v. Governor of Lewis Prison, [1917] 2 K.B. 254.
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reporting was allowed before 1967. 9
to prove that trials were prejudiced
proceedings-and before 1967 there
hearing-it was generally believed
unbridled publicity.

Although it was not possible
by full reports of committal
was no alternative to a full
that prejudice resulted from

The Criminal Justice Act of 1967 did not require that evidence
be heard in camera,but that publication of the evidence be restricted. By section 3 (4), a report of committal proceedings may be
published or broadcast only with respect to limited subjects. 10 Contravention of the section carries a fine of up
to £500,11 and report2
ing is stripped to the bare bones of the case.'
9. It was a "rule" at common law that, where evidence of a person's previous convictions was given in a magistrates' court in committal proceedings, that evidence should not be referred to by a newspaper in
its report of the proceedings. The King v. Sanderson, 31 T.L.R. 447
(1915). But the court apparently had no power to prevent such reports: "So far as the publication of that information is concerned, this

court has no power to compel the press, but this court agrees that it
is very undesirable that such information should be given." The King
v. Armstrong, [1951] 2 All E.R. 219 (Lynskey, J.). This common law
rule is now subsumed by the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 3.
10. The subjects _which may be reported under the Criminal Justice Act,
1967, c. 80, § 3 (4), are:
(a) the identity of the court and the names of the examining
justices;
(b) the names, addresses and occupations of the parties and
witnesses and the ages of the defendant or defendants
and witnesses;
(c) the offence or offences, or a summary of them, with
which the defendant or defendants is or are charged;
(d) the names of counsel and solicitors engaged in the proceedings;
(e) any decision of the court to commit the defendant or defendants for trial, and any decision of the court on the
disposal of the case of any defendants not committed;
(f) where the court commits the defendant or any of the
defendants for trial, the charge or charges, or a summary
of them, on which he is committed and the court to
which he is committed;
(g) where the committal proceedings are adjourned, the
date and place to which they are adjourned;
(h) any arrangements as to bail on committal or adjournment;
(i) whether legal aid was granted to the defendant or any
of the defendants.
11. Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 3(5). Proceedings can only be instituted by or with the consent of the Attorney-General. Id. § 3(6).
12. The press noted that with such restrictions it would be no longer
worthwhile in most cases to send reporters to cover committal pro-

ceedings, and that therefore even these facts would not be reported.
The Criminal Justice Act of 1967 therefore requires the justices' clerk
to give notice of the most basic facts, e.g., the defendant's name and
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The restrictions do not apply, and the magistrates have no
discretion, where the defendant, or any one of the defendants, asks
that they be lifted. 13 It has been held that an order made under
section 3(2) applies to the totality of the committal proceedings
14
and that a magistrate has no jurisdiction to make a limited order.
This is so even if the proceedings concern several defendants and
one of them obtains an order lifting the restrictions-the order then
will apply to all the defendants, including those joined later.15
The restrictions apply only if the defendant, or any defendant,
is committed, and then only until the conclusion of the trial. So a
full report of the proceedings may be made Where the magistrates
determine not to commit any of the defenders or, if there is a
committal, at the end of the trial of the last to be tried.1
The provisions of section 3 were criticised in the press as
legalising "secret trials." The proceedings themselves are not secret, however, but open to press and public. There are other
safeguards: if the accused is committed for trial, the proceedings
may be reported at the end of the trial; and if there is no committal
the press may report in full immediately. The fact that the accused may waive the restrictions is also important. There may, for
example, have been great press publicity concerning police investigations prior to the committal proceedings. In such a case a
detailed account of the less sensational prosecution evidence, even
without defence evidence, can help to put the matter in perspective.
It is also possible that witnesses will come forward as a result of
7
this publicity.1
2.

Juvenile Court

The reporting of proceedings that concern children is severely
limited. The Children and Young Persons Act of 193318 prohibits
the publication of any newspaper report of proceedings in a juvenile court which reveals the name, address or school, or includes
any particulars calculated to lead to the identification of any child
address, whether he has been committed and if so, upon what charges
and to which court. Id. § 4.
13. Id. § 3(2).
14. The Queen v. Russell, [1969] 1 Q.B. 342 (1968).
15. The Queen v. Blackpool Justices, [1972] 1 All E.R. 388 (1971).
16. Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, §§ 3(3) (a), (b).
17. This, of course, is an argument against the imposition of any restrictions at all. The Tucker Committee found very slender evidence that
witnesses would come forward as a result of publicity.
18. Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 49(1).
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or young person 19 concerned in those proceedings, either as being
the person against whom or in respect of whom the proceedings are
taken or as being a witness therein, unless the court permits it. The
section thus covers any information which might lead to the identification of the child, and has been extended to apply to sound and
television broadcasts as well as to newspaper reports. 20 The Secretary of State may by order dispense with the requirements of the
section if he is satisfied that such is in the interests of
justice. The Children and Young Persons Act of 193321 also
gives the juvenile court power to direct that any or all of the above
restrictions shall apply to proceedings in any other court. Under
this provision the juvenile court must expressly limit the publication.
3. Indecent Evidence
One final statutory restriction applies in all proceedings in any
court, and all the above statutory provisions are impliedly 22 subject
to it. Section 1 (1) (a) of the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of
Reports) Act of 1926 provides that it shall be unlawful to print or
publish in relation to any judicial proceedings any indecent matter
or indecent medical, surgical, or physiological details which would
be calculated to injure public morals. An exception is made in
respect of the publication of any material in a bona fide set of law
reports which does not form part of any other publication and consists solely of reports of court proceedings, or of any material in
any publication of a technical character bona fide intended for
23
circulation among members of the legal or medical professions.
4. Possible Extensions
The above provisions represent the full extent to which the
legislature has imposed restrictions on reporting. The most likely
area of reform is in rape cases. The Sexual Offences Bill currently
before Parliament would restrict the publication, after an accusation of rape has been made, of particulars identifying the com19. For Juvenile Court purposes, a child or young person is defined as
one under the age of 17. Id. § 46(1).
20. Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, c. 37, § 57(4).
21. Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 39(1), as
amended by Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, c. 37, § 57 (4).
22. The Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act, 1926, 16 & 17
Geo. 5, c. 61, § 1, provides that "nothing in this part of this subsection
shall be held to permit the publication of anything contrary to the
provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection."
23. Id. § 1(4).
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plainant. The restrictions could be24lifted where publicity is necessary for the collection of evidence.
B.

Common Law Restrictions

The statutory restrictions outlined above are fetters on the
factual content of reports of certain court proceedings. They are
exceptions to the general rule that proceedings in open court can be
reported in full. A fair and accurate report is privileged against
any action for defamation by, for example, a witness or a third
party who may have no connection with the case beyond being the
subject of some defamatory allegation by a defendant or a witness.25 A fair and accurate report also cannot amount to a coneven if it is likely to prejudice a party to any future
tempt of court
26

litigation.

Thus in The Queen v. Kray2 7 further charges were pending
against the defendant when newspaper reports were published
concerning Kray's conviction for murder in a trial which had just
ended. At the second trial, defence counsel sought to challenge
prospective jurors for cause, on the ground that the murder conviction had been so extensively reported in the press as to be likely to
influence jurors. Lawton, J., rejected this argument regarding
most of the reports:
24. The House of Commons committee considering the Bill has accepted
an amendment which would extend anonymity to defendants. There
is no sign, however, that Parliament is considering legislation, such
as that adopted in New Zealand, which suppresses automatically the
names of those charged with any criminal offense unless or until there
is a conviction. It is interesting to note that the New Zealand legislation began with reference only to victims in sex cases.
25. See Lewis v. Levy, 120 Eng. Rep. 610 (K.B. 1958). Lord Campbell,
C.J., delivered the judgment of the court: "In Curry v. Walter (1 B.
& P. 525) it was decided, above sixty years ago, that an action cannot
be maintained for publishing a true account of the proceedings in a
Court of justice, however injurious such publication may be to the
character of an individual." Id. at 617.
The Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., c. 64, § 3,
states: "A fair and accurate report in any newspaper of proceedings
publicly heard before any court exercising judicial authority shall, if
published contemporaneously with such proceedings, be privileged:
provided that nothing in this section shall authorize the publication
of any blasphemous or indecent matter."
26. "So long as any account so published is fair and accurate and is published in good faith and without malice, no one can complain that its
publication is defamatory of him .

.

. notwithstanding that it may in

fact be likely to create prejudice against a party to civil or criminal
litigation." In re Consolidated Press, [1937] N.S.W. 255, 257-58
(Jordan, C.J.).
27. [1969] Crim. App. 412.
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I can see no reason why a newspaper should not report what
happens in court, even though there may be other charges pending.
The reporting of trials which take place in open courts is an important part of the function of a newspaper, and it would not be in
the public interest, in my judgment, if newspapers desisted from
reporting trials, and from reporting verdicts and sentences in these
trials, merely because there was some indictment still to be dealt
with. What is more, the mere fact that a newspaper has reported
a trial and a verdict which was adverse to a person subsequently
accused ought not in the ordinary way to produce a case of probable bias against jurors empanelled in a later case. I have enough
confidence in my fellow-countrymen to think that they have got
newspapers sized up just as they have got other public institutions
sized up, and they are capable in normal circumstances of looking
at a matter fairly and without prejudice even though they have
to disregard what they may have read in a newspaper. So, the
mere fact that an earlier trial had been reported in the Press wbuld
not, in my judgment, amount to establishing a prima facie case of
the probability of bias or prejudice in anyone summoned to attend
as a juror for a later trial. A number of newspapers commented
on the evidence in the earlier trial. I can see nothing wrong in
that, provided the comment was fair. 28

But the court did allow counsel to challenge the jurors, for two
newspapers had dredged up certain discreditable facts which were
not evidence at the trial. The question of contempt was not raised,
but Lawton, J., concluded his judgment with a strong warning:
Having called the attention of the Press to the difficulty which
has been created by newspapers bringing into public view facts
which were not established at the first trial, the mere occasion of
this judgment will, I hope, result in a similar situation never aris29
ing again in the foreseeable future.
The reports of the two offending newspapers went beyond
fairness and accuracy and could not have been protected from the
law of contempt if a fair trial on the further counts could be shown
to have been prejudiced. The other reports, however, were fair
and accurate, and could not have been in contempt even if prejudice
had in fact been occasioned.
A report is fair and accurate if the correct meaning of the
proceedings or statement is conveyed. The report need not be
word-perfect. In The King v. Evening News,3 0 the Recorder, in his
summing-up to the jury, had said:
The evidence in this case is of an extraordinary character, and there
can be no doubt, I should say-it is for you to judge-that Hobbs
was a party to a gigantic fraud, as monumental and perhaps as
28. Id. at 414.
29. Id. at 416.
30. [1925] 2 K.B. 158.
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impudent3 a fraud as has ever been perpetrated in the course of
our law. '

The newspaper report omitted the words "it is for you to judge." It
was held that this omission did not materially alter the meaning of
the Recorder's words, which may have prejudiced the defendant's
case. Lord Hewart said: "It would not be right to punish a newspaper for reporting a charge where the real sting of the criticism
is directed against the charge itself.132 The omission of a single
word, however, clearly could constitute a grave inaccuracy. In an
Australian case 33 the defendant to a charge of murder was reported
to have confessed to murder, when he had in fact only admitted to
killing. This report was held in contempt of court.
A report which is fair and accurate still may be in contempt if
it is not made in good faith, for a publication made with intent to
prejudice court proceedings will always be in contempt even if no
prejudice is in fact occasioned.
III. PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
The restrictions on the reporting of court proceedings so far
considered are curbs on the freedom of the press in the interest of
a fair trial, i.e., in the interest of the individual. There is a direct
clash of interests, but neither is specifically protected by any constitutional guarantee in England. It is perhaps for this reason that
the conflict rarely manifests itself as a burning English social or
political issue. Despite the fears and protests of the press at the
restrictions imposed by the Criminal Justice Act of 1967 on the
reporting of committal proceedings, and isolated examples of concern over specific issues, 34 it is not possible to phrase the argument
in terms of two sacred principles at odds. The British "constitution"3 5 contains no first or sixth amendment to pose the logically
irreconcilable problems which have arisen from recent "gag orders" in the United States. The English common law, and the
31. Id. at 160.
32. Id. at 170.
33. The Queen v. West Australian Newspapers, 60 W. Austl. L.R. 108
(1958).
34. E.g., Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1974] A.C. 273,
where the House of Lords ruled that The Sunday Times would be in
contempt of court to publish an article which in effect charged the
Distillers Company (Biochemicals) Ltd., with negligence for market-

ing the drug thalidomide. Negligence was one of the issues in pending

litigation against the company and publication, it was held, would
prejudice that issue.
35. The British "constitution" is sometimes said to be "unwritten" or a
collection of many documents and principles.
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legislature in the case of committal proceedings, simply has cast its
vote in favour of a fair trial whenever it has conflicted with the
freedom of the press.
The conflict of interests frequently has been recognised. In
The King v. Blumenfeld," for example, Phillimore, J., said that
"the court had to reconcile two things-the right of free speech
and the public advantage that a knave should be exposed, and the
right of an individual suitor to have his case fairly tried." 37 Phillimore, J., recognised that in order to reconcile the two there had to
be limits to both:
[T]here were limits to the right of free speech, and no doubt articles or statements made near the time of the trial, especially on
the eve of the trial or made at a place near in point of locality,
were calculated to create an atmosphere unfavourable to one of the
parties by deterring witnesses from coming forward and speaking
their minds freely or by warping the minds of jurymen, and these
should be deemed an interference with the course of justice, and
should be restrained
by the wholesome exercise of the jurisdiction
of the court.38
The right to a fair trial is favoured not merely for the sake of
the individual defendant but for the sake of society at large by
protecting the unprejudiced administration of justice. A statement
tending to bias a potential juror in favour of the accused is as much
a contempt of court as a statement in favour of the prosecution, and
the privilege of free expression is curtailed only so far as necessary
to exclude prejudice. Subject to the restriction noted above it is
permissible to make a fair and accurate report of any court proceeding.
Neither does the law of contempt limit pretrial publicity of the
circumstances and the police investigations of a crime, although the
sensationalisation of these events clearly could prejudice the person
ultimately arrested and tried. 39 But this freedom to report criminal investigations exists only before proceedings are pending or
imminent. This field now will be explored in more detail.
The governing principle underlying restrictions on pretrial publicity is, like that behind coverage of the trial itself, the defendant's
36. 28 T.L.R. 308 (1912).
37. Id. at 311.
38. Id.

39. But if such a report is published mala fide in order to prejudice a
suspect or defendant this surely would be contempt.
It may make little difference whether a report says that police are
hunting for the murderer of X and later that they have arrested Y,
and are charging him with murder, or whether the report says that
the police have arrested Y, the murderer of X. Yet the latter will
be in contempt of court and the former, in most cases, will not.
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right to a fair trial. Most of the complex laws of evidence are
designed to protect the defendant and to enable determination of
the true facts by the exclusion of unreliable or irrelevant data. The
ways in which this protection could be destroyed by free-ranging
press reporting are numerous. For example, the publication of an
involuntary confession by the accused, inadmissible as evidence,
would be unreliable and highly prejudicial. English law has been
set against trials by the media, because, in the words of Wills, J.:
[T] heir tendancy and sometimes their object is to deprive the court
of the power of doing that which is the end for which it existsnamely, to administer justice duly, impartially, and with reference
solely to the facts judicially brought before it. Their tendancy is
to reduce the court which has to try the case to impotence, so far
as the effectual elimination of prejudice and prepossession is concerned. It is difficult to conceive an apter description of such conduct than is conveyed by the expression "contempt of court.' 40
Any attempt to usurp the function of the court to the prejudice
of the safeguards provided by the rules of evidence and procedure
is severely punished by English law. A contempt is committed if
there is a real risk of prejudice, even if no prejudice is in fact
caused.
The two essential ingredients of a "fair trial" are absense of
bias, and freedom to determine facts. Publications which induce
bias or prejudice the accurate determination of facts are likely to
constitute contempt in England.
A. Publications Inducing Bias
It is of primary importance that the court or jury approach the
issue of guilt with complete impartiality. This was forcefully
stated by Lord Alvestone, C.J., in The King v. Tibbits: 41
A person accused of a crime in this country can properly be convicted in a court of justice only upon evidence which is legally admissible and which is adduced at his trial in legal form and shape.
Though the accused be really guilty of the offence charged against
him; the due course of law and justice is nevertheless perverted
and obstructed if those who have to try him are induced to approach the question of his guilt or innocence with minds into which
prejudice has been instilled by published assertions of his guilt or
to which the laws of the
imputations against his life and character
42
land refuse admissibility as evidence.
There are many ways in which the impartiality of the court can
be impaired. An opinion on the merits or the outcome of a case
40. The King v. Parke, [1903] 2 K.B. 432, 437.
41. [1902] 1 K.B. 77 (1901).
42. Id. at 88.
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clearly will amount to a contempt. This is the very issue which has
to be determined by the court on the strength or weakness of the
admissible evidence. If a newspaper expresses such an opinion
either during or before a trial there is a clear risk of a prejudicial
effect on impanelled or potential jurors. A clear assertion of guilt,
or innocence, is the most obvious example. Such cases are rare
but not unknown. In The Queen v. Odhams Press Ltd.,4 3 the
publishers of The People newspaper were held in contempt for the
publication of an article which was one of a series dealing with
prostitution and brothel-keeping in London. The banner headline
read "Arrest this beast,"' 4 4 and a photograph of one Micallef was
displayed. It was alleged that he was "up to his eyes in this foul
business of purveying vice and managing street women. '45 At the
time of publication, Micallef was under arrest awaiting committal
for trial for brothel-keeping. Lord Goddard, C.J., delivering the
judgment of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, said:
With the truth or falsity of the various allegations in the article
this court is not concerned, for it is not and could not be disputed
that anything more calculated to prejudice a fair trial could not
well be imagined, and considering that the proprietors claim a circulation of over four million copies a week, there is a strong possiread by at least some of those summoned
bility that it would be 46
as jurors to the sessions.
Less direct opinions of guilt also have been held to constitute
contempt. In The King v. Williams47 a play was staged in which
one John Thretwell was presented as a murderer. At the time,
48
Thretwell was charged with murder. In The Queen v. Balfour,
while Balfour was awaiting trial on a charge unspecified in the
report, the Review of Reviews published an article which contained
the following statement: "Another rare rogue in the shape of'Jabez
Balfour was a good deal before the courts last month. He will reappear at the Old Bailey, and then we may expect to hear no more
of him for some time to come. Nemesis has leaden feet, but even
justice comes to him who knows how to wait. '49 Wright, J., asked
in argument: "How can it be fair comment that a man who is on
his trial will be convicted?" 50 It was held that the article was in
contempt. Wills, J., said that the principle to be applied in such
cases was clear:
43.

[1957] 1 Q.B. 73 (1956).

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 74.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
[1824] 2 L.J.K.B. 30 (1823).

48. 11 T.L.R. 492 (1895).

49. Id. at 492.
50. Id.
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It was not because the comments might damage the accused person
that the court would interfere, but on a broader and higher ground
-namely, that it was the province of the tribunal before whom
the charge was tried to determine as to his guilt or innocence. The
fact that jurors could be trusted not to let their minds be prejudiced
was no answer to this application. The writer here had thrown
his contribution into the stream of prejudice against the person to
be tried and was anticipating the result of the trial, which was an
illegal and improper thing to do. 5 1
The media also must take care in describing the nature of the
charge. In one case, 52 a widely distributed newsfilm featured an
"Attempt on King's life" and showed the arrest of the alleged
suspect. In fact the latter was charged with a less serious offence
than attempted murder, and, because the film tended to create
prejudice against the accused, it was held to amount to a contempt
of court.
Because attempts to prejudice the issue are in contempt due to
their tendancy to upset the impartial administration of justice, an
of innocence is as much in contempt as an imputation
imputation
53
of guilt.
Any comment on the character of the accused which is calculated to excite hostility will amount to a contempt, for its prejudicial effect is obvious. At the trial, evidence of the accused's bad
character is inadmissible except in limited circumstances. 5 4 It is
51. Id. at 493.
52. The King v. Hutchinson, [1936] 2 All E.R. 1514.
53. The Queen v. Castro, [1873] L.R. 9 Q.B. 219.
If it is open to those who take the part of the accused to discuss in public meetings the merits of the prosecution in the
interest of the accused, it is obvious that it must be equally
open to those who believe in the guilt of the party accused
and the propriety of the prosecution, and believe a conviction
is necesary to the ends of justice, to collect meetings and to
hold language of the opposite tendency; and thus the course
of justice might be interfered with and disturbed by discussions taking place outside the walls of a court of justice
but which might in the end influence proceedings within it.
Id. at 226.
54. Evidence of the misconduct of the accused on other occasions must
not be given if its only relevance is to show a disposition towards
wrongdoing in general, or a disposition to commit the particular crime
with which he is charged. It is only admissible if it is of very high
probative value. "The basic principle must be that the admission of
similar fact evidence ... is exceptional and requires a strong degree
of probative force." Director of Public Prosecutions v. Boardman,
[1975] A.C. 421, 444 (1974) (Lord Wilberforce).
When the accused does not give evidence (he is not a compellable
witness), the prosecution can only give evidence of his bad character
if the defense raises the issue, e.g., by calling witnesses to speak of
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important therefore that those who have a part to play in the trial
should not be exposed to information which is excluded by these
rules. It may be very easy for a newspaper to comment unfavourably on the character of the accused, and a thorough exploration of
his perhaps murky past may have considerable popular news value.
Any publication which brings to the notice of the public, and
therefore potential jurors, facts of this nature will be in contempt
because of their obvious tendency to prejudice the issue.
Thus the publication of an accused's criminal record is forbidden. In The King v. Parke55 the Star newspaper revealed that one
Dougal, then awaiting trial on a charge of forgery, had been
convicted of forgery eight years previously, and had been sentenced
to twelve months' imprisonment with hard labour. The editor was
held in contempt of court, for the article was "unquestionably
calculated to produce the impression that, apart from the charges
then under inquiry, he was a man of bad... character."5 6
Similarly, any suggestion that the accused is of disreputable
character apart from having past convictions will be in contempt if
it is likely to prejudice his defence. In The Queen v. Thomson
his good character, or by cross-examining witnesses for the prosecution
with a view to inducing them to do so.
When the accused gives evidence himself he is immune from questions concerning his past conduct or his bad character by virtue of
the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, § 1 (f):

A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this
Act shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to
answer, any question tending to show that he has committed
or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other
than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character,
unless(i) the proof that he has committed or been convicted of
such other offence is admissible evidence to show that
he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then charged;
or
(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of
the witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character, or has given evidence of
his good character, or the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character
of the prosecution or the witnesses for the prosecution;
or
(iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged
with the same offence.
Id. The very complexity and detail of these rules, which have given
rise to some very nice problems of interpretation in practice, show the
extent to which they will be undermined if allowed to be ignored outside the courtroom.

55.

[1903] 2 K.B. 432.

56. Id. at 435 (Wills, J.).
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Newspapers Ltd.,57 Michael Malik was awaiting trial for an offence
under the Race Relations Act of 1965.58 The Times published a
photograph of Malik with the caption: "Michael Abdul Malik, 34,
West Indian. Came to UK 1950, took to politics after an unedifying career as brothel keeper, procurer, and property racketeer.
Muddled thinker, but natural flair for self-advertisement." 59 This
was a blatant contempt because "except in special circumstances, a
jury is not entitled to know anything of the prisoner's bad character
")60

The publication of a confession by the accused, whether admissible or not, is also a threat to the impartiality of the court. A
pretrial confession is no proof of guilt because the accused may
repudiate the confession at his trial, or it may be inadmissible
because involuntary.
The danger of publishing alleged confessions is clear from the
case of The King v. Clarke.61 The Daily Chronicle reported that
after his arrest in Canada, Crippen, the accused, admitted, in the
presence of witnesses, to killing his wife, but denied murdering her.
This report was held to be in contempt. Darling, J., stated that:
[A]nything more calculated than that to prejudice the defence of
a man can hardly be conceived. This statement is circulated
among those who will be jurors at the trial ... because the jurors
are drawn from the whole body of the county of Middlesex, in
which this paper is widely circulated. No one can suppose that
the jurymen entered the jury box in this case without ever having
heard of it; but the less they hear of a case before they come to
listen to the evidence the better, and newspapers do not help in
the administration of justice by publishing what one can only
It is most important that the admindescribe as idle gossip ....
istration of justice in this country should not be hampered as it is
hampered in some other countries, and ... we are determined
to substitute in this country trial
while we are here to do nothing
by newspaper for trial by jury. 62
B. Publications Which Prejudice Accurate Determination of Facts
Any interference with the administration of justice which results
in the suppression of facts clearly can be as prejudicial to a fair trial
as a biased assessment of the true facts. A publication can have
the effect of deterring witnesses from coming forward while not
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

[1968] 1 All E.R. 268 (Q.B. 1967).
Race Relations Act, 1965, c. 73.
[19681 All E.R. at 269.
Id.
103 L.T.R. (n.s.) 636 (K.B. 1910).
Id. at 640.
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necessarily being directed at any particular witness. Although this
has occurred more frequently in civil cases, there have been examples in criminal trials. 63 Any publication which tends to induce
the court to treat with scepticism the evidence of a witness by
attempting
to discredit that witness will also constitute a con4
tempt.

Any publication of private investigation by a newspaper will
amount to contempt if it interferes with the court's own determination of the facts. The published facts may bear no resemblance to
the evidence which is admissible, and in fact admitted, at the trial.
In The King v. Editor & Printers & Publishers of the Evening
Standard,G5 the Evening Standard had embarked upon and published details of an independent investigation into a crime for
which a suspect had been arrested and charged. This was held in
contempt. Lord Hewart, C.J., made clear in strong terms that it
was no part of the duty of a newspaper to elucidate the facts of a
case while the trial was pending:
Those who had to judge by the results could see what a perilous
enterprise this sort of publication was. It was not possible even
for the most ingenious mind to anticipate with certainty what were
to be the real issues ...

in a trial which was about to take place.

It might be that a date, a place, or a letter, or some other thing
which, considered in itself, looked trivial, might prove in the end
to be a matter of paramount importance. It was impossible to foresee what was important. 66

The publication of interviews with witnesses may also be in
contempt, for this anticipates the evidence which may be given in
court, and may be different from it. An item of hearsay evidence,
63. For example in The Queen v. Socialist Worker, [1975] 1 Q.B. 637
(1974), the publishers of an article were held in contempt of court
for revealing the names of black-mail victims who had been referred
to at the trial as Mr. X and Mr. Y and whose identity the judge ordered to be kept secret. This was out of no feeling of tenderness towards the victims, but so as not to discourage such witnesses in the
future. Lord Widgery, C.J., said that "by destroying the confidence
of witnesses in potential black-mail proceedings in the protection
which they would get, there was an act calculated to interfere with
the due course of justice." Id. at 652.
64. See, e.g., In re Labouchere, 17 T.L.R. 578 (K.B. 1901), where the testimony of a witness was described as "this masterstroke of ingenious
impudence." Id. at 578. The article containing this comment was held
by Bruce, J., to be "calculated to imply that Cowen was not a witness
to be relied upon, that it held him up as a person whose conduct was
to be condemned and that it might prejudice the mind of any juryman
against Cowen, who happened to read it." Id. at 579.
65. 40 T.L.R. 833 (K.B. 1924).
66. Id. at 835.
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for example, might feature prominantly in any such interview, but
would be inadmissible at the trial. Similarly, an interview with a
leading suspect should not be published. In The Queen v. Savundranayagan67 Savundranayagan appealed against his conviction for
fraud because of pretrial publicity which had been given to his
case. At a time when, according to Salmon, L.J., "[i] t must surely
have been obvious to everyone that Savundranayagan was about
to be arrested and tried on charges of gross fraud,"0 8 he was
interviewed on television. Although no charges for contempt were
brought, Salmon, L.J., made it clear that similar interviews in the
69
future would attract such charges.
Where identification is likely to be an issue at the trial the
publication of photographs of the accused will also be in contempt,
because such a publication might induce a witness to identify the
accused from a recollection of the photographs. In The King v.
Daily Mirror70 Lord Hewart, C.J., commenting on the publication
of a photograph where identity was in issue said:
The unfairness of that course is manifest, because the witness approaches the difficulty and it may be the crucial task of identification with his mind prejudiced by the knowledge that this particular person has been arrested and is in the hands of the police. 7 1
In all the above cases the major consideration was the potential
effect of the publication upon jurors. A jury is more likely to be
prejudiced by such publications than a judge, who is aware of the
67. [1968] 3 All E.R. 439 (C.A.).
68. Id. at 441.
69.
No-one should imagine that he is safe from committal for contempt of court if, knowing or having good reason to believe
that criminal proceedings are imminent, he chooses to publish
matters calculated to prejudice a fair trial. On any view the
television interview with the appellant Savundranayagan was
deplorable. With no experience of television, he was faced
with a skilled interviewer whose clear object was to establish
his guilt before an audience of millions of people. None of
the ordinary safeguards that exist in a court of law were observed, no doubt because they were not understood. They
may seem prosaic to those employed in the entertainment
business, but they are the rocks on which freedom from oppression and tyranny have been established in this country for
centuries .... This court hopes that no interview of this
kind will ever again be televised. The court has no doubt that
the television authorities and all those producing and appearing in televised programmes are conscious of their public responsibility and know also of the peril in which they would
all stand if any such interviews were ever to be televised in
the future. Trial by television is not to be tolerated in a
civilized society.
Id.
70. [1927] 1 K.B. 845.
71. Id. at 849.
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rules of evidence and so should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible. The very reason why some character
evidence and hearsay statements are inadmissible at the trial is that
the jury is thought not to have this capacity. The only way to
overcome the difficulty is to ensure that the public are not exposed
to prejudicial publications at all. Their minds must be blank at
the start of a trial. Lord Ellenborough made this clear in 1811:
If anything is more important than another in the administration
of justice, it is that jurymen should come to the trial of those persons on whose guilt or innocence they are to decide, with minds
pure and unprejudiced. Is it possible they should do so, after having read for weeks and months before ex parte statements of the
evidence against the accused,
which the latter had no opportunity
72
to disprove or controvert?

It is not necessary that the publication actually prejudice the
trial. It is sufficient that it be calculated 73 to do so. In The Queen
v. Savundranayagan,74 for example, Savundranayagan's appeal was
dismissed because in the particular circumstances of the case no
prejudice had been occasioned by the pretrial publicity. Yet the
television interview was undoubtedly in contempt. The courts,
however, are conscious of their arbitrary powers in relation to
contempt and will not punish a contempt which has in fact caused
no prejudice unless there was a real risk of prejudice or an intention by the publishers to prejudice proceedings. To satisfy the
"real risk of prejudice" test the publication must represent a substantial threat to a fair trial. There must be "a real risk as opposed
to a remote possibility that the article was calculated to prejudice a
fair hearing, '75 and "a finding of contempt of court must be based
on a solid view of the likelihood of such interference and not on
76
fanciful notions."
An intention to prejudice proceedings will be a
court if no prejudice has been occasioned and even if
risk of such prejudice. Most of the cases under
concern attempts to bribe or threaten judges, 7 7 but

contempt of
there was no
this heading
a newspaper

72. The King v. Fisher, 170 Eng. Rep. 1253, 1255 (K.B. 1811).

73. "Calculated" is used in the cases to convey an objective meaning. The
publication must have the tendency, objectively considered, to prejudice the case.
74. [1968] 3 All E.R. 439 (C.A.)
75. The Queen v. Duffy, [1960] 2 Q.B. 188, 200 (Lord Parker, C.J.).

76. Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., [1960] 3 All E.R. 289,
293 (Ch.) (Russel, J.).

77. E.g., Martin's Case, 39 Eng. Rep. 551 (Ch. 1747), where Thomas Martin
sent a private letter to the Lord Chancellor concerning a threatened
suit against him, and was unwise enough to enclose a £20 note. The
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campaign designed to prejudice the outcome of an appeal would
constitute a contempt even if it were held that
there was no real
78
risk of the appellate tribunal being influenced.
The discussion above has concerned the types of publications
which may amount to contempt. But there arise stages before and
after which the law of contempt will not operate at all, whatever
the nature of the publication, unless there is an intention to prejudice the proceedings. Lord Parker, C.J., has said that the first
question must always be whether, when the publication was made,
the proceedings "were still sub judice or pending, so that the
publication of improper matter might amount to contempt of
court.179

There is no conclusive authority on the question of when

the law of contempt begins in relation to criminal proceedings.
There is a line of cases which shows that the law is operative when
criminal proceedings are "pending." The best illustration is a
statement of Cockburn, C.J., in 1873: "It is clear that this Court
has always held that comments made on a criminal trial or other
proceedings, when pending, is an offence against the administration
of justice and a contempt on the authority of this Court." 80 This
was from a clear case-proceedings were held to be pending, and so
subject to the law of contempt, where committal proceedings had
taken place, but the trial had not yet begun.8 ' The point was more
fully explored in The King v. Clarke.8 2 Crippen, the accused, was
arrested on warrant on July 31st on board ship, but was not
returned to England and formally charged until August 27th. On
August 5th a newspaper report appeared in England containing an
alleged confession by Crippen. One of the questions in the case
was whether the law of contempt operated at all. The defence
contended that it could not operate until the accused formally had
been charged. This was rejected by the court. Darling, J., said:
"We see no authority nor do we see any reason which can be
deduced from any authority which obliges us to hold that there are
no pending proceedings until the person has actually been put in
the dock and charged with the offence."8 3 To do so would be a
damaging limitation on the powers of the court:
head of the judiciary was, of course, incorruptable, but Martin's action
amounted to a contempt.
78. See The Queen v. Duffy, [1960] 2 Q.B. 188, 194 (Lord Parker, C.J.).
79. Id. at 195.

80. The Queen v. Castro, [1873] L.R. 9 Q.B. 219, 227.
81. The principle was extended in The King v. Parke, [1903] 2 K.B. 432,
where proceedings were "pending" for contempt purposes where a suspect had been remanded in custody but not yet committed for trial.
82. 103 L.T.R. (n.s.) 636 (K.B. 1910).

83. Id. at 639.
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[W]e are asked to say that after the magistrate has performed a
judicial act upon sworn information laid before him there are no
proceedings against an accused person, and where the person has
been arrested upon a warrant and is in custody, that there are no
proceedings against the accused person in the sense that anybody
is at liberty to say whatever he pleases concerning the case, which
has got as far as an information on oath, has got as far as the issue
of a warrant after judicial consideration by a magistrate, and has
got as far as the execution of that warrant by the arrest of the
accused person. In my opinion it would be gravely to narrow
the
84
jurisdiction of this court to lay down any such rule as that.

Although this case concerned arrest by warrant, it is likely that
proceedings also would be considered to be pending after an arrest
85
without warrant. This view has been adopted in Australia.
There is dicta in The King v. Clarke from all three members of the
court that the law of contempt begins to operate after the issue of a
warrant, and not just after the arrest: "There is ample authority for
holding that the 8prosecution
has begun, at any rate, when the
6
warrant is issued."
Although it is clear that the law catches publications after
proceedings are pending, there is no clear authority to support the
proposition that proceedings must be pending. There is a hint that
the judicial machinery need not necessarily have been set in motion
in the judgment of Wills, J., in The King v. Parke8 7 where he said:
"It is possible very effectually to poison the fountain of justice
before it begins to flow."8 8
In The Queen v. Odhams Press Ltd., 9 Lord Goddard, C.J.,
quoted Wills, J., and was of the opinion that the law of contempt
could begin earlier than an arrest or the issue of a warrant. The
84. Id. Darling, J., gave an example of what might happen if such were
the law:
Suppose a man to have been accused by information, to have
been arrested upon warrant, and to be about to be tried before
the magistrate, then ... anyone, without the slightest danger,
in any newspaper or elsewhere, might say what he pleased
about that matter in the way of comment, give any kind of
opinion as to what the evidence was which was likely to be
brought against the man, and, if that were so, it is perfectly
obvious that the prisoner or his friends might easily take
steps, not by conspiracy with the person giving the information, but in consequence of the information so given, to bring
the whole prosecution to a futile end.
Id.
85. James v. Robinson, 109 C.L.R. 593 (Austl. 1963).
86. 103 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 640 (Pickford, J.). See also id. at 639 (Darling,
J.); id. at 641 (Lord Coleridge, J.).
87. [19033 2 K.B. 432.
88. Id. at 438.
89. [19571 1 Q.B. 73 (1956).
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word "imminent" was first used in relation to this prejudicial stage
by Lord Hewart, C.J., in 192700 but, although the authority is only
obiter, the strongest support comes from the judgment of Salmon,
L.J., in The Queen v. Savundranayagan9' where he said: "No-one
should imagine that he is safe from committal for contempt of
court if, knowing or having good reason to believe that criminal
proceedings are imminent, he chooses to publish matter calculated
to prejudice a fair trial. '0 2 But there is direct authority in Australia against this view.92
While it is unclear whether the "imminent" test will be accepted in English law, it is still less clear what "imminent" means. In
the Northern Irish case of The Queen v. Beaverbrook Newspapers
Ltd.,94 Sheil, J., thought it meant "impending" or "threatening,"
and in The Queen v. Savundranayagan,95 Salmon, L.J., pointed out
that at the time of the television interview with Savundranayagan
that "it must surely be obvious to everyone that he was about to be
arrested and tried on charges of gross fraud."9 6 It must be clear
that an arrest is to be expected in the near or immediate future. It
is impossible to be more precise than that.
The determination of when the ambit of the law of contempt
ceases is an easier question. There is no postjudicial twilight zone
as there is before a trial when proceedings are merely imminent.
97
Wills, J., expressed the matter succinctly in The King v. Parke:
"It is possible very effectually to poison the fountain of justice
before it begins to flow. It is not possible to do so when the stream
90. The King v. Daily Mirror, [1927] 1 K.B. 845, 851.
91. [1968] 3 All E.R. 439 (C.A.).
92. Id. at 441. There is also support for a distinction between proceedings
which are "pending" and those which are "imminent," both caught by
the law of contempt, in the Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9
Eliz., c. 65, § 11 (1):
A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court on the
ground that he has published any matter calculated to interfere with the course of justice in connection with any proceedings pending or imminent at the time of publication if at that
time (having taken all reasonable care) he did not know and
had no reason to suspect that proceedings were pending, or
that such proceedings were imminent, as the case may be.
Commenting on this subsection in The Queen v. Beaverbrook
Newspapers Ltd., [1962] N.I. 15, Sheil, J., said: "Whatever may be
said of the distinction between 'proceedings pending' and 'proceedings
imminent,' it is clear from the use of the words 'as the case may be'
that a distinction was intended." Id. at 21.
93. James v. Robinson, 109 C.L.R. 593 (Austl. 1963).
94. [1962] N.I. 15.
95. [1968] 3 All E.R. 439 (C.A.).
96. Id. at 441.
97. [1903] 2 K.B. 432.
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has ceased." 8 A case will remain sub judice until any appeal has
been determined in the defendant's favour, or the time in which
any possible appeal may be made has expired. It must be remembered that we are here concerned only with the time during which
the law of contempt operates. Because appeals are heard by
judges alone it is far less likely that a contempt would be found at
this stage, for there is less likelihood of influencing the tribunal,
and the facts of the case rarely will be in dispute. The extension of
the operative period, is, however, relevant, for there may be cases
where a publication is held to discourage a convicted defendant
from appealing.
IV. CONCLUSION
The "bare facts" of a case always may be reported. Such facts
were described in an Australian case 99 as including "extrinsic
ascertained facts to which any eye-witness could bear testimony,
such as the finding of a body and its condition, the place in which
it is found, the person by whom it was found, the arrest of a person
accused, and so on." 100 But in the same case a warning was
sounded which permeates the whole law on this subject:
But as to the alleged facts depending on the testimony of some particular person which may or may not be true, and may or may
not be admissible in a Court of Justice, other considerations arise.
The lawfulness of the publication in such cases is conditional and
depends, for present purposes, upon whether the publication is
likely to interfere with a fair trial of the charge against the accused
person.1O'
It is vital that the publication not prejudice any issue in the case,
such as the accused's defence or the question of his guilt.
It is legitimate to publish accounts of police investigations
leading up to an arrest. Even though the publication of photographs of an accused where identity is in issue will amount to
contempt, it is not contempt for the media to publish photographs
or other information at the request of the police in order to help
them with inquiries. The risk of prejudice may be outweighed by
the public interest in bringing offenders to justice, but may not be
outweighed by mere public curiosity.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 438.
Packer v. Peacock, 13 C.L.R. 577 (Austl. 1912).
Id. at 588 (Griffith, C.J.).
Id.

